، بخش 3 قانون اساسی بنا نهاد: “کنگره اختیار دارد تمام قوانین و مقررات لازم در مورد قلمرو یا سایر املاک متعلق به ایالات متحده را وضع و وضع کند…” او حکم داد که بند مالکیت “فقط در مورد املاکی که ایالتها در آن زمان به طور مشترک در اختیار داشتند اعمال میشود و هیچ اشارهای به هیچ قلمرو یا املاک دیگری که حاکمیت جدید ممکن است بعداً به دست آورد، ندارد.” [ 45 ] از آنجا که قلمرو لوئیزیانا در زمان تصویب قانون اساسی بخشی از ایالات متحده نبود، کنگره اختیار ممنوعیت بردهداری در این قلمرو را نداشت. بنابراین، مصالحه میسوری از محدوده اختیارات کنگره فراتر رفت و خلاف قانون اساسی بود، و از این رو، درد اسکات صرف نظر از محل اقامتش در قلمرو شمال غربی ظاهراً آزاد، همچنان یک برده محسوب میشد، [ 46 ] و او همچنان تحت قانون میسوری، که اختیار تام بر این موضوع را داشت، یک برده محسوب میشد. به همه این دلایل، دادگاه به این نتیجه رسید که اسکات نمیتواند در دادگاه فدرال ایالات متحده اقامه دعوی کند. [ 46 ]
توافقات
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قضات وین ، کاترون ، دنیل ، نلسون ، گریر و کمپبل ، همگی به طور جداگانه لوایح خود را نوشتند و گریر نیز به لوایح نلسون پیوست.
مخالفتها
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قضات بنجامین رابینز کرتیس (چپ) و جان مکلین (راست)، تنها دو قاضی که در پرونده درد اسکات با رأی مخالف مخالفت کردند
قضات بنجامین رابینز کرتیس و جان مکلین با تصمیم دادگاه مخالفت کردند و هر دو نظرات مخالف خود را ارائه دادند.
مخالفت 67 صفحهای کورتیس استدلال میکرد که نتیجهگیری دادگاه مبنی بر اینکه سیاهپوستان نمیتوانند شهروند ایالات متحده باشند، از نظر قانونی و تاریخی بیاساس است. [ 41 ] او اشاره کرد که در زمان تصویب قانون اساسی در سال 1789، مردان سیاهپوست میتوانستند در پنج ایالت از 13 ایالت رأی دهند. طبق قانون، این امر آنها را شهروند ایالتهای خود و ایالات متحده میکرد. کورتیس در حمایت از موضع خود به بسیاری از قوانین ایالتی و تصمیمات دادگاه استناد کرد. مخالفت او “بسیار قانعکننده” بود و باعث شد تانی صدور تصمیم را برای چند هفته به تعویق بیندازد و 18 صفحه ردیه به نظر اکثریت اضافه کند. [ 41 ]
مخالفت مکلین این استدلال را که سیاهپوستان نمیتوانند شهروند باشند، «بیشتر سلیقهای میدانست تا قانونی». او به بخش زیادی از تصمیم دادگاه به عنوان یک حکم قطعی غیرالزامآور حمله کرد و استدلال کرد که وقتی دادگاه تشخیص داد که صلاحیت رسیدگی به پرونده اسکات را ندارد، باید بدون صدور حکم در مورد ماهیت دعوی اسکات، به سادگی این دعوی را رد میکرد.
کرتیس و مکلین هر دو به لغو مصالحه میسوری توسط دادگاه حمله کردند. آنها خاطرنشان کردند که تصمیمگیری در مورد این سوال ضروری نبود و هیچ یک از نویسندگان قانون اساسی هرگز به مفاد ضد بردهداری فرمان شمال غربی یا قوانین بعدی که بردهداری را در شمال 36°30′ شمالی ممنوع میکرد ، یا ممنوعیت واردات برده از خارج از کشور که در سال 1808 تصویب شد، اعتراضی از نظر قانون اساسی نکردهاند. کرتیس گفت که بردهداری در قانون اساسی به عنوان یک “حق طبیعی” ذکر نشده است، بلکه یک امر ناشی از قانون عمومی است. ماده چهارم، بخش 3 قانون اساسی بیان میکند: “کنگره قدرت دارد تا تمام قوانین و مقررات لازم مربوط به قلمرو یا سایر املاک متعلق به ایالات متحده را تعیین و وضع کند. و هیچ چیز در این قانون اساسی نباید به گونهای تفسیر شود که به ادعاهای ایالات متحده یا هیچ ایالت خاصی لطمه بزند.” هیچ استثنایی برای بردهداری که بنابراین تحت قدرت نظارتی کنگره قرار میگرفت، قائل نشد. [ 47 ]
واکنشها
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حکم دیوان عالی در پروندهی درد اسکات با خشم گستردهای در خارج از ایالتهای بردهدار مواجه شد. [ 41 ] مورخ سیاسی آمریکایی ، رابرت جی. مککلاسکی، این واکنش را اینگونه توصیف میکند:
به نظر میرسد طوفان نفرین و دشنام که بر سر قضات نازل شد، آنها را مبهوت کرده است؛ آنها به جای خاموش کردن جنجال بردهداری، شعلههای آن را شعلهورتر کرده و علاوه بر این، امنیت بازوی قضایی دولت را عمیقاً به خطر انداخته بودند. حتی در روزهای پرآشوب پس از قوانین بیگانگان و آشوب ، چنین توهینی شنیده نشده بود . مطبوعات شمالی به نظر تانی به عنوان یک «سخنرانی بیمقدمه» شرورانه حمله کردند و به طرز شرمآوری به اشتباه نقل قول و تحریف شد. یکی از روزنامهها نوشت: «اگر مردم از این تصمیم اطاعت کنند، از خدا نافرمانی کردهاند.» [ 46 ]
بسیاری از جمهوریخواهان، از جمله آبراهام لینکلن ، که به سرعت در حال تبدیل شدن به جمهوریخواه پیشرو در ایلینوی بود و سه سال بعد به عنوان رئیس جمهور انتخاب شد، این تصمیم را بخشی از توطئهای برای گسترش و در نهایت تحمیل قانونی کردن بردهداری در تمام ایالتها میدانستند. [ 48 ] برخی از افراطگرایان جنوبی میخواستند که همه ایالتها بردهداری را به عنوان یک حق اساسی به رسمیت بشناسند. لینکلن نظر اکثریت دادگاه مبنی بر اینکه “حق مالکیت یک برده به طور مشخص و صریح در قانون اساسی تأیید شده است” را رد کرد و خاطرنشان کرد که قانون اساسی هرگز به بردگان به عنوان دارایی اشاره نکرده و در واقع آنها را به صراحت “شخص” نامیده است. [ 49 ]
دموکراتهای جنوبی، جمهوریخواهان را شورشیانی قانونشکن میدانستند که با امتناع از پذیرش تصمیم دیوان عالی به عنوان قانون کشور، باعث تفرقه میشدند. بسیاری از مخالفان بردهداری در شمال، استدلالی قانونی برای امتناع از پذیرش تصمیم درِد اسکات در مورد مصالحه میسوری ارائه دادند. آنها، به پیروی از نظر مخالف قاضی کرتیس، استدلال کردند که تصمیم دیوان مبنی بر اینکه دادگاههای فدرال صلاحیت رسیدگی به این پرونده را ندارند، بقیه تصمیم را به یک حکم غیابی غیرالزامآور تبدیل کرده است – یک توصیه به جای تفسیری معتبر از قانون. استفن داگلاس در مناظرات لینکلن-داگلاس به این موضع حمله کرد :
آقای لینکلن به دلیل رأی قضایی دیوان عالی ایالات متحده در پروندهی دِرِد اسکات ، به جنگ با این دیوان میرود . من از تصمیمات آن دادگاه – از تصمیم نهایی بالاترین دادگاه قضایی شناخته شده در قانون اساسی ما – اطاعت میکنم.
لینکلن در سخنرانی خود در اسپرینگفیلد، ایلینوی ، پاسخ داد که حزب جمهوریخواه به دنبال سرپیچی از حکم دیوان عالی نیست، اما امیدوار است که بتوانند آن را متقاعد کنند که حکم خود را لغو کند: [ 50 ]
ما، به اندازه قاضی داگلاس، (شاید بیشتر) به اطاعت و احترام به بخش قضایی دولت معتقدیم. ما فکر میکنیم که تصمیمات آن در مورد مسائل قانون اساسی، وقتی کاملاً حل و فصل شوند، نه تنها باید موارد خاص مورد بررسی، بلکه سیاست کلی کشور را نیز کنترل کنند، و تنها با اصلاح قانون اساسی، همانطور که در خود آن سند پیشبینی شده است، میتوان آن را مختل کرد. بیش از این، انقلاب خواهد بود. اما ما معتقدیم که تصمیم درِد اسکات اشتباه است. ما میدانیم که دادگاهی که این تصمیم را گرفته، اغلب تصمیمات خود را نادیده گرفته است و ما تمام تلاش خود را خواهیم کرد تا این تصمیم را نادیده بگیرد. ما هیچ مقاومتی در برابر آن نشان نمیدهیم.
دموکراتها پیش از این از پذیرش تفسیر دادگاه از قانون اساسی ایالات متحده به عنوان یک قانون الزامآور دائمی خودداری کرده بودند. در دوران دولت اندرو جکسون ، تانی، که در آن زمان دادستان کل بود، نوشته بود:
صرف نظر از قدرت رأی دیوان عالی در الزام طرفین و حل و فصل حقوق آنها در پرونده خاص پیش رویشان، من حاضر نیستم بپذیرم که تفسیری که دیوان عالی در تصمیمگیری در مورد هر یک یا چند پرونده به قانون اساسی میدهد، خود را به طور برگشتناپذیر [ sic ] و دائمی در آن پرونده خاص تثبیت میکند و ایالتها و قوای مقننه و مجریه دولت عمومی را برای همیشه ملزم به پیروی از آن و پذیرش آن در هر مورد دیگر به عنوان قرائت صحیح سند میکند، اگرچه همه آنها ممکن است در باور به اشتباه بودن آن متفقالقول باشند. [ 51 ]
فردریک داگلاس ، یکی از سیاهپوستان برجسته طرفدار لغو بردهداری که این تصمیم را خلاف قانون اساسی و استدلال تانی را مغایر با دیدگاه پدران بنیانگذار میدانست، پیشبینی کرد که این تصمیم، مناقشه بر سر بردهداری را به اوج خود خواهد رساند:
بالاترین مقام سخن گفته است. صدای دیوان عالی کشور بر فراز امواج آشفته وجدان ملی به گوش رسیده است… [اما] امیدهای من هرگز روشنتر از اکنون نبوده است. من هیچ ترسی ندارم که وجدان ملی با چنین دروغ آشکار، آشکار و رسواکنندهای به خواب رود… [ 52 ]
به گفته جفرسون دیویس ، سناتور وقت ایالات متحده از میسیسیپی و رئیس بعدی کنفدراسیون ، این پرونده صرفاً «این سؤال را مطرح میکرد که آیا کافی [اصطلاح تحقیرآمیز برای یک سیاهپوست] باید در وضعیت عادی خود نگه داشته شود یا خیر… [و] آیا کنگره ایالات متحده میتواند تصمیم بگیرد که چه چیزی میتواند در یک سرزمین جزو اموال باشد یا نباشد – در این مورد، یک افسر ارتش برای انجام وظیفه عمومی خود به سرزمینی اعزام شده و برده سیاهپوست خود را با خود برده است.» [ 53 ]
تأثیر بر طرفین دعوی
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ایرن امرسون در سال 1850 به ماساچوست نقل مکان کرد و با کالوین سی. چافی ، پزشک و طرفدار لغو بردهداری که از طریق حزب « هیچچیز را نمیدانم» و جمهوریخواهان به کنگره راه یافته بود، ازدواج کرد . پس از حکم دیوان عالی، روزنامههای طرفدار بردهداری به چافی به عنوان یک ریاکار حمله کردند. چافی اعتراض کرد که درد اسکات متعلق به برادر همسرش است و او هیچ ارتباطی با بردگی اسکات ندارد. [ 35 ] با این وجود، چافیها به عنوان وسیلهای برای آزادی اسکات، سندی را امضا کردند که خانواده اسکات را به هنری تیلور بلو ، پسر مالک سابق اسکات، منتقل میکرد که میتوانست شخصاً در دادگاه میسوری حاضر شود. [ 35 ] تیلور بلو پیش از این نیز در طول این پرونده به هزینههای حقوقی اسکات کمک کرده بود. [ 54 ]
تیلور بلو در 26 مه 1857، مدارک مربوط به آزادی بردگان را به قاضی همیلتون ارائه داد. آزادی درد اسکات و خانوادهاش خبر ملی بود و در شهرهای شمالی جشن گرفته شد. اسکات به عنوان باربر در هتلی در سنت لوئیس کار میکرد، جایی که او یک فرد مشهور جزئی بود. همسرش لباسها را میشست . درد اسکات در 7 نوامبر 1858 بر اثر سل درگذشت . هریت در 17 ژوئن 1876 درگذشت. [ 21 ]
Dred Scott versus Sandford was a landmark case heard before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1856/57 , the outcome of which is considered one of the key triggers of the American Civil War .
In the trial, the slave Dred Scott attempted to claim his freedom on the grounds that he had temporarily lived in slave-free states and territories of the USA. The ruling, announced in 1857 by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney , himself a former slaveholder, generally denied the civil rights of African Americans and strengthened the rights of slaveholders: slaves were the legal property of their owners, and the constitutional right to private property therefore protected slavery throughout the United States, even in states that had banned it.
In effect, the ruling declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. It had prohibited slavery in all territories north of the line at 36° 30′ north latitude, with the exception of Missouri . The ruling intensified the conflict between the Northern states, which saw themselves forced onto the defensive, and the slave-holding Southern states. After the Civil War, slavery was abolished through the 13th , 14th , and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (passed in 1870), and the 1857 ruling was overturned.
In American historiography, Scott v. Sandford is generally considered the worst Supreme Court decision, ahead of Plessy v. Ferguson or Korematsu v. United States, giving the court a bad reputation for nearly a century. [ 1 ]
background
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Dred Scott was an African American man born into slavery in Virginia around 1800 and owned by Peter Blow’s family. In 1830, the family moved with Scott from Alabama to St. Louis , Missouri . After Peter Blow’s death in 1832, the family sold Dred Scott around 1833 to John Emerson, a surgeon in the American Army. In 1833, Emerson was transferred from St. Louis and served for over two years at Fort Armstrong in Illinois , whose constitution had already abolished slavery. In 1836, he was transferred to Fort Snelling in the Wisconsin Territory (now Minnesota ), which was also considered “free” under the Missouri Compromise . During this time, Scott married Harriet Robinson, a slave belonging to officer William B. Taliaferro, something he would have been denied in the slave-holding South . [ 2 ]
In 1837, Emerson was transferred back to St. Louis and from there to Fort Jesup in Louisiana . He left Scott with his wife in the Wisconsin Territory for a few months and continued to rent him out there, even though the Missouri Compromise outlawed slavery in that territory. In 1838, Emerson married Eliza Irene Sanford , whose given name was Irene, at Fort Jesup. In 1838, Emerson was transferred back to Fort Snelling, where the Scotts accompanied him. On the way there, Harriet Scott gave birth to their first daughter, Eliza, on a steamboat north of Missouri in ‘free’ territory. [ 3 ]
In 1840, Emerson was transferred to Florida to serve in the Seminole War . On the way there, Emerson left his wife and the Scotts behind in St. Louis. After being discharged from the army in 1842, he settled in Davenport , Iowa Territory . When Emerson died in December 1843, his estate, including the Scotts and their two daughters, passed to his widow, Irene. Alexander Sanford, Irene’s father, was appointed administrator of Emerson’s Missouri estate. Irene returned to St. Louis, and the Scotts continued to rent out their property to other people. For example, in March 1846, Samuel Russell employed their services. Three years after Emerson’s death, Scott tried unsuccessfully to buy his freedom from the widow. He then filed a lawsuit in the Missouri courts in April 1846, seeking release from slavery. [ 4 ]
Course of proceedings
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State level
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Precedents
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Dred Scott
When Scott filed his lawsuit in 1846, the doctrine established by precedent was that a slave was entitled to freedom if, with the consent of his owner, he had resided in a state or territory where slavery was prohibited. Even if the slave had voluntarily returned to Missouri, this did not renew his status as a slave after his emancipation, and the owner had forfeited his right to the slave (according to the principle “once free, always free”). Important precedents that would become important during Scott’s progress through the courts included:
• Winny v. Phebe Whitesides (1824): The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a person held as a slave in Illinois, a free state, and then brought to Missouri was entitled to freedom. The owner had forfeited his right to the slave by residing in a free state and had not renewed his right by returning to Missouri. [ 5 ]
• John Merry v. Tiffin and Menard (1827): The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a slave was emancipated by residing in areas where slavery was prohibited by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. [ 6 ]
• Nat v. Stephen Ruddle (1834): Nat’s claim for freedom was rejected by the Missouri Supreme Court because he had gone to Illinois without his owner’s consent. However, the court emphasized in its ruling that he would have won his freedom had he had his owner’s consent. [ 7 ]
• Rachael v. Walker (1837): Rachael, the slave of an army officer, had accompanied her owner from St. Louis to Fort Snelling, spent several years there, and then returned with him to St. Louis. Because of her stay at Fort Snelling, she sued for freedom and won. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled: “An officer of the U.S. Army, who takes his slaves to a military post, within the territory wherein slavery is prohibited, and retains her several years in attendance on himself and family, forfeits his property in such slave by virtue of the ordinance of 1787.” [ 8 ]
St. Louis Circuit Court
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On April 6, 1846, both Dred Scott and Harriet Scott filed petitions with the St. Louis Circuit Court requesting permission to sue Irene Emerson. The Missouri Statute of 1845 stated that slaves who believed they had a reasonable claim to freedom could petition a Missouri circuit court to sue their owners. If the judge agreed, the slave could sue in court. In their petitions, the Scotts asked for permission to sue Irene Emerson for trespass for false imprisonment. That same day, Judge John M. Krum granted their petition. Since Dred Scott v. Irene Emerson and Harriet Scott v. Irene Emerson were virtually identical cases, it was agreed that only Dred Scott v. Irene Emerson would be heard, and that the ruling in his case would also apply to Harriet. For the duration of the proceedings, Scott was handed over to the sheriff, who was to continue to lease him and administer the profits on a provisional basis. [ 9 ]
On June 30, 1847, the first trial took place before the St. Louis Circuit Court under Judge Alexander Hamilton. Scott had to prove his right to freedom. Catherine Anderson testified that she had hired Scott from Emerson at Fort Snelling for two to three months and that Scott had also been hired out to other people while Emerson was at Fort Jesup. This proved that Emerson had kept Scott as a slave in a free territory. Other witnesses confirmed the same facts for Illinois, meaning Scott was a slave in a free state. However, since the lawsuit was against Irene Emerson and not her deceased husband, it now had to be proven that Irene Emerson was the owner of Dred Scott. To do this, the Scott side called Samuel Russell to the witness stand. Russell had hired Scott from Irene Emerson in March 1846 and paid her father, Alexander Sanford, for the job. However, during cross-examination by the defense, it emerged that it was not Samuel Russell, but his wife, who had hired Scott. Samuel Russell had paid Alexander Sanford, but did not know whether the money actually went to Irene Emerson. Thus, he could only confirm through hearsay that Irene Emerson was Scott’s owner, which the defense did not consider to be legal evidence. Judge Hamilton instructed the jurors that Russell’s testimony should therefore be disregarded. The jury acquitted Irene Emerson. [ 10 ] [ 11 ]
Scott’s lawyers then demanded a new trial, arguing that it was not the facts that were against Scott, but a technicality that could be resolved by Mrs. Russell’s call to the witness stand. Judge Hamilton granted Scott a new trial on December 2, 1847. Emerson appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court ( Irene Emerson v. Dred Scott ). The issue was not Scott’s freedom, but that a lower court had granted Scott a new trial. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected Emerson’s appeal. [ 12 ] As a result, the second trial in Scott v. Emerson began on January 12, 1850, in the St. Louis Circuit Court. To prove that Irene Emerson was the owner of Scott, Adeline Russell was called to the witness stand. She testified that she had hired Scott from Mrs. Emerson. This proved that Mrs. Emerson was the owner. The defense argued that Irene Emerson had the right to lease Scott because, while at Fort Snelling and Fort Armstrong, he had been under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army under military law and at no time in free territory under civilian law. (In doing so, the Emerson side completely ignored the precedent Rachael v. Walker .) The jury found that “the defendant is guilty of manner and form as in the plaintiff’s declaration alleged.” Judge Hamilton ordered the release of Scott and his family. In the eyes of the law, he had been a free man since his stay at Fort Armstrong in 1833. At no point was the political controversy of the slavery issue brought into the proceedings before the Circuit Court. The sole issue was Scott’s freedom, which was granted to him in accordance with precedent. [ 13 ]
Missouri State Supreme Court
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Following the guilty verdict and after a new trial in the circuit court was denied, Emerson appealed to the Missouri State Supreme Court . Emerson moved to Massachusetts and married Calvin C. Chaffee , an abolitionist , while her father continued to manage the estate in Missouri. On March 8, 1850, both sides made their submissions. In the Missouri Supreme Court, Emerson expected success because it had been ruled in Nat v. Stephen Ruddle that residence without the owner’s consent did not confer freedom and Emerson had only gone to the free territories because of the army, and again raised the military jurisdiction argument. Scott’s attorney pointed to the St. Louis Circuit Court decision and, citing Rachael v. Walker , argued that the question of military jurisdiction was irrelevant. Moreover, Emerson had voluntarily left the Scotts at Fort Snelling when he went to Fort Jesup. [ 14 ]
At this point, the case became political. Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton had opposed the Jackson Resolves of 1847, which stated that the United States Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories. This led to a movement in Missouri to remove Benton. Two of Benton’s opponents were William Barclay Napton and William Scott. Napton was one of the three current justices of the Missouri Supreme Court (the other two being John F. Ryland and James Harvey Birch ), and Scott was one of his predecessors. Napton and Scott agreed to use the earliest opportunity to reverse decisions based on the validity and binding force of the Northwest Ordinance. Ryland opposed this, while Birch wanted to go further and reverse decisions that had prohibited slavery in the territories as a result of the Missouri Compromise. [ 15 ]
On October 25, 1850, the Missouri Supreme Court convened in St. Louis. By this time, it was becoming apparent that Benton would not be re-elected. Napton then convinced Birch that it was not necessary to go so far as to overturn the Missouri Compromise. Ryland also changed his mind and now wanted to agree. This would revise all Missouri precedents that considered the Northwest Ordinance to be binding. Napton began to write the decision. While he was still waiting for papers to cite, however, the justices of the Missouri Supreme Court were newly elected. In August 1851, the case of Scott v. Emerson was transferred to the newly elected Missouri Supreme Court, which was now presided over by Hamilton Rowan Gamble , Ryland, and the same William Scott who had agreed with Napton to overturn the Northwest Ordinance. [ 16 ]
In November 1851, the Missouri Supreme Court reconsidered the case. Scott filed the same brief as in 1850, and Emerson filed a belated brief in which she slightly modified her argument. This time she questioned the applicability of the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise. However, she did not question their constitutionality, but rather the principle of “once free, always free.” As precedent, they pointed to Strader v. Graham , which had been decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1851 and held that the law of the state in which the slave was located applied, not that of any state in which he had been. On March 22, 1852, the Missouri Supreme Court announced its decision in Scott v. Emerson . The opinion was written by William Scott, Ryland wrote a concurring opinion , and Gamble a dissenting opinion. The Missouri Supreme Court had ruled that Missouri law did not have to bend to the laws of other states if they conflicted with Missouri’s interests (“No state is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws”). In a 2-1 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned all precedents and held that “the voluntary removal of a slave, by his master, to a State, Territory, or Country, in which slavery is prohibited, with a view to a residence there, does not entitle the slave to sue for his freedom, in the courts of this State.” Thus, slaves could not obtain freedom in a Missouri court. Once free did not always mean free. When Dred Scott voluntarily returned to Missouri, he had given up his right to freedom. Thus, the St. Louis Circuit Court’s decision was overturned. The Missouri Supreme Court ordered the case to be returned to the St. Louis Circuit Court, which would issue a new ruling in accordance with the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling that slaves could not obtain freedom through a Missouri court. Dred Scott’s freedom was thus short-lived. [ 17 ]
Federal level
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After the defeat in the Missouri Supreme Court, the quickest and easiest way to win Scott’s freedom would have been to go to the United States Supreme Court. However, there was a risk that the US Supreme Court would rule as in Strader v. Graham , which would have meant a quick end to Scott’s quest for freedom. The only way for Scott to still win his freedom would be an investigation or review of the emancipation that had been granted by Congress through its ban on slavery in the territories. To do this, Scott had to file a lawsuit in federal court. It was no longer just a matter of Scott’s personal freedom, but of a broader political decision. [ 18 ]
Circuit Court of the United States
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On November 2, 1853, Scott filed a lawsuit in the United States Circuit Court against John F.A. Sanford, Irene Emerson’s brother, for assault, holding, and imprisonment. The official name of the case, Scott v. San d ford , originates from a typist’s error that was never corrected. Although it is not documented in the sources and is highly dubious, Sanford, who continued to administer his brother-in-law’s estate, claimed to be Scott’s owner (though through Irene’s marriage to Chaffee, the property actually passed to Chaffee, who, however, was unaware that his wife owned slaves and only learned of his wife’s involvement in the case during the course of the proceedings). Since Sanford was a citizen of the State of New York and Scott claimed to be a citizen of the State of Missouri, the case could be brought before a federal court under the diversity of citizenships principle. The United States Constitution provides that in such cases, proceedings may be brought directly before federal courts. [ 19 ]
On April 7, 1854, Sanford’s attorney demanded that the lawsuit be dismissed. He argued that the U.S. Circuit Court had no jurisdiction because Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, as he was a “negro of African descent.” [ 20 ] Thus, for the first time in the proceedings, the issue of black citizenship , i.e., the question of whether “Negroes” could be citizens of the USA (“African Americans”), was raised. On April 25, 1854, Judge Robert W. Wells ruled that Scott’s lawsuit should be allowed, since every free person had the right to sue. Therefore, if Scott was not a slave, he had the right to sue. Wells’ decision would therefore only be justified (or not) after a verdict. For the time being, Wells declared that a resident of Missouri who could own property—which, in his view, applied to Scott—could be considered a citizen for the purpose of suing in a federal court. The proceedings before the U.S. Circuit Court were thus underway. [ 21 ]
The trial took place on May 15, 1854. Scott’s side argued that Scott was free because of the Northwest Ordinance, the Illinois Constitution, and the Missouri Compromise. Judge Wells instructed the jurors that Scott’s status depended on the laws of Missouri. The jury followed this instruction. Because the Missouri Supreme Court had ruled that Scott was a slave, the jury in Scott v. Sandford declared that Scott belonged to Sanford and was not free. During this first phase of the federal trial, the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was not an issue. No one questioned the emancipation of slaves. The issue was whether freedom gained in a free territory was lost by returning to a slave territory. A new issue that arose during the trial before the U.S. Circuit Court, and which would later have profound consequences for all slaves and their descendants in the Supreme Court’s ruling, was the question of whether Black people could be citizens, which Sanford’s representation called into question for the first time. [ 22 ]
United States Supreme Court
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Process flow
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On December 30, 1854, Scott appealed the federal court’s decision to the Supreme Court of the United States , arguing that Judge Wells had erred in his jury instructions. When Scott appealed to the Supreme Court, five justices (Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Campbell, and Taney) were from slave states , and four were from the North (McLean, Curtis, Nelson, and Grier). However, because Nelson and Grier were so-called ‘doughfaces’ (Northerners with Southern principles), there was no political balance in the Supreme Court, which was a Democratic stronghold. Scott’s chances of success were therefore vanishingly slim. [ 23 ]
The Court accepted the complaint and scheduled a four-day hearing for February 1856. Arguments were presented from February 11 to 14. The arguments revolved primarily around three questions. First, could Black people be American citizens ? Second, did Congress have the power to prohibit slavery in the territories? Third, was the Missouri Compromise constitutional? Montgomery Blair , Scott’s attorney, argued that Scott had been emancipated by the Illinois Constitution. Black people did not possess all civil rights, but unless explicitly excluded, they were entitled to the rights of other citizens. Blair assumed that a citizen of a state was also a citizen of the United States. Henry S. Greyer and Reverdy Johnson , Sanford’s attorneys, claimed that Scott had never been free because Congress did not have the authority to prohibit slavery. The issue was no longer whether Scott could lose his freedom, but whether he had even acquired it. [ 24 ]
The justices deliberated beginning on February 22, 1856, and the issue of jurisdiction was problematic. They unanimously decided that the arguments should be re-argued. During this re-argument, both parties were to focus particularly on the question of whether the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the case was legitimate and whether a free Black person could be a U.S. citizen and thus sue in federal court, thus bringing a so-called “suit in diversity.” New arguments were submitted and presented on December 15, 1856. Sanford’s attorney argued that in order to sue in federal court, one had to be a citizen of the state in which one lived, and Missouri did not grant Black people this right. Greyer and Johnson further argued that although the Illinois Constitution and the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery, this did not mean that slaves were actively emancipated. A final argument was that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional: Nowhere in the United States Constitution was Congress granted the right to prohibit slavery. Blair argued for Scott that the Missouri Compromise was constitutional because Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution gave Congress the power “to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or the property belonging to the United States.” [ 25 ] The question of citizenship could not even be up for debate, since the opposing side had not objected to it in the lower court’s decision. Furthermore, there was a statute in Missouri that explicitly recognized the citizenship of free Black people, since people who were citizens in other states were also citizens when they came to Missouri. [ 26 ]
After hearing the new arguments, the justices deliberated beginning on February 14, 1857. They initially agreed not to address the citizenship issue or the Missouri Compromise in their ruling. They wanted to base their decision on the principle that the Supreme Court normally follows the decisions of the state supreme courts and on the principle established in Strader v. Graham that the status of a Black person depended on the law of the state in which they were located. But then the court reversed course. Based on the available sources, researchers have identified three possible reasons for this: McLean and Curtis wanted to write a powerful dissenting opinion; Wayne convinced the others that addressing citizenship and the Missouri Compromise would win a victory for the South and end any agitation on the slavery issue regarding the territories; and outsiders put pressure on the justices to have the court overturn Congress’s ban on slavery. [ 27 ]
Judgment and reasoning
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On March 6, 1857, Chief Justice Taney announced the Supreme Court’s decision. It was against Scott by a vote of seven to two. The court considered three essential questions to be resolved:
1. Did the court have jurisdiction? Could Black people, as U.S. citizens, sue in a federal court?
2. Did Congress have the authority to prohibit slavery in the territories?
3. If not, did Missouri have to recognize Scott’s freedom because of his residence in Illinois? [ 28 ]
In his reasoning for the ruling, Taney first addressed the question of whether the court even had jurisdiction over the case. Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution stipulates that federal jurisdiction extends to disputes between citizens of different states. By differentiating between federal citizenship and state citizenship—he believed that citizens of a state were not automatically citizens of the United States—Taney introduced a completely new legal interpretation and thus the concept of dual citizenship. He also explained that, after the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, states were prohibited from arbitrarily determining who was considered a citizen and from granting people (i.e., Black people) privileges to which they were not entitled. According to Taney, the phrase “to ourselves and posterity” (ourselves and our posterity) in the preamble referred only to white people. [ 29 ] It was therefore completely irrelevant whether Missouri considered Scott a citizen or not. The only relevant question, according to Taney, was whether Scott could perhaps be considered a citizen of the United States before the adoption of the Constitution. This possibility, however, was also rejected by the Court. It described the Black people at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
“… as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”
“…as beings of an inferior order, altogether incapable of uniting themselves with the white race, either socially or politically; so inferior indeed that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the Negro, for his own good, might by right and law be confined to slavery.”
– CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY [ 30 ]
By holding that Negroes had no right to bear arms, vote, or participate in lawsuits with white litigants at the time of the founding of the United States, Taney ignored historical facts, as Curtis demonstrated in his dissent. Taney thus concluded that Scott was not a citizen of a state under the Constitution and therefore had no right to sue at the federal level. [ 31 ] [ 32 ]
The court used an argumentum ad consequentiam , stating that a judgment in Scott’s favor would have intolerable consequences:
“It would give to persons of the negro race, […] the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, […] the full freedom of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went”
“It would give persons of the Negro race the right to enter any state at will, to exercise complete freedom of speech in public and private on all subjects on which its [the state’s] own citizens could speak, to hold public meetings on political subjects, and to keep and bear arms.”
– CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY [ 33 ]
Taney now turned to the question of whether Congress had the authority to prohibit slavery in the territories. Because the Court had ruled that Scott had no right to sue in federal court, many contemporaries and even some legal scholars viewed this as a dictum , a non-binding opinion, because Taney should not have been allowed to proceed without jurisdiction. However, Taney’s opinion was binding until further notice. The Court had ruled that Scott, as a Black man, could not be a citizen. Taney justified this by stating that Scott could not be a citizen because he was a slave. In his eyes, Scott was a slave even though he had lived in the Wisconsin Territory for an extended period. The Court reasoned that Congress lacked the authority to pass the Missouri Compromise, and it was therefore unconstitutional. [ 34 ] This was only the second time the Court had declared a federal law unconstitutional since the landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison . Taney interpreted the Territory Clause of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 3, Paragraph 2: “Congress shall have the power to dispose of the lands and other property of the United States, and to make all necessary orders and regulations therein […]”) [ 29 ] in such a way that it only applied to territories that had already belonged to the United States in 1787. However, in his eyes, the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional not only for this reason, but also because it violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution , which guarantees the property of citizens. Taney considered slaves to be property, and through the Missouri Compromise, slaveholders were being unlawfully deprived of their property by Congress. [ 35 ]
Now Taney only had to clarify whether Scott could be free by staying in Illinois. He denied this, based on the precedent decision of Strader v. Graham : The fact that a slave was free by staying in a free state did not mean that he was permanently emancipated if he returned to a slave state. [ 36 ]
Six justices concurred with Chief Justice Taney’s opinion; Nelson concurred with the outcome but disagreed with the reasoning. Justices Curtis and McLean dissented.
In summary, the Supreme Court ruled in Scott v. Sandford :
1. The decision regarding the dismissal of the case by the US Circuit Court fell within the purview of the Supreme Court.
2. Black people weren’t citizens. They couldn’t sue in federal court. The U.S. Circuit Court shouldn’t have accepted the case.
3. Scott was not free while at Fort Snelling because the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.
4. Scott was not free because of his stay at Fort Armstrong according to Strader v. Graham .
5. For these reasons, the case was returned to the U.S. Circuit Court, which had to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
Effects
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The ruling was the culmination of a political movement that attempted to expand slavery in the United States. As a result of the acquisition of new territory at the beginning of the 19th century and the resulting admission of new states, the Missouri Compromise was concluded in 1820. This compromise limited slavery, with the exception of Missouri, to the states south of a line at 36° 30′ north latitude. From 1854 onwards, this compromise was increasingly undermined, primarily by Democratic Party politicians . According to the Kansas-Nebraska Act , all new states, including those north of the 40th parallel, were to be able to decide for themselves whether slavery should be permitted or prohibited in their territory. The Dred Scott v. Sandford decision further supported this principle. In the northern states, this was increasingly perceived as a threat to their own position. This is echoed, for example, in Abraham Lincoln ‘s famous House Divided Speech .
Although Judge Taney believed his verdict had definitively settled the slavery issue, he achieved the exact opposite: In the North, it united opponents of slavery, while in the Southern states, it encouraged secessionist elements to make even more far-reaching demands. Furthermore, it splintered the Democratic Party into hostile Northern and Southern factions, thus strengthening the fledgling Republican Party . While the majority of Republicans did not yet reject slavery in principle, they did reject its spread to other territories and the resulting increase in power for Southern states and slaveholders.
Chaffee ceded his rights to Dred Scott to Taylor Blow, the son of Scott’s first owner, Peter Blow. He set Dred Scott and his family free on May 26, 1857. Scott died of tuberculosis on September 17 of the following year .
The Scott v. Sandford decision, along with Plessy v. Ferguson , is considered one of the worst in American legal history. It was overturned in 1865 by the 13th Amendment, which ended slavery, and in 1868 by the 14th Amendment, which defined citizenship (“all persons born or naturalized in the United States”).
